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Financial Contagion: Evolutionary Optimisation 





Over the past two decades, financial market crises with similar features have occurred in 
different regions of the world. Unstable cross-market linkages during a crisis are referred to as 
financial contagion. We simulate crisis transmission in the context of a model of market 
participants adopting various strategies; this allows testing for financial contagion under 
alternative scenarios. Using a minority game approach, we develop an agent-based 
multinational model and investigate the reasons for contagion. Although the phenomenon has 
been extensively investigated in the financial literature, it has not been studied through 
computational intelligence techniques. Our simulations shed light on parameter values and 
characteristics which can be exploited to detect contagion at an earlier stage, hence 
recognising financial crises with the potential to destabilise cross-market linkages. In the real 
world, such information would be extremely valuable in developing appropriate risk 
management strategies. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Emerging markets have experienced a variety of financial crises over the past 
twenty years (e.g. Mexico in 1987, Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, etc.), with shocks 
originating from one country being transmitted to its neighbours.  This has been 
described as contagion or interdependence (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002; Caporale et al., 2005).  In order to distinguish between the two, one 
should compare linkages between markets in stable and crisis periods: a ‘significant’ 
increase in cross-markets linkages after a shock to a group of countries is defined as 
‘contagion’ (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), whilst stable linkages (through which the 
crisis is transmitted) are referred to as ‘interdependence’.  Detecting contagion at an 
early stage would make crisis management more effective.  If shocks are transmitted 
through stable cross-market linkages, then countries experiencing them might be able to 
deal with crises by adopting policies to improve economic fundamentals.  If instead 
shocks are propagated even though the fundamentals are sound, then IMF intervention 
might be appropriate (Caporale et al., 2005).  
Since the seminal paper by Fama (1970), markets have often been thought of as 
being efficient.  However, the empirical evidence is rather mixed (LeRoy, 1989).   
Consequently, agent-based models have become increasingly popular in recent years as 
an alternative approach to modelling financial markets (see LeBaron, 2000 for a review).  
Such models are based on artificial markets populated with heterogeneous agents with 
learning optimisation capabilities.  They stress interactions, and learning dynamics in 
groups of traders learning about the relations between various factors.  For example, 
Frankel and Froot (1988), Kirman (1991) and De Grauwe et al. (1993), focus on 
strategies that are used to trade a risky asset.  Developments in computer technology  
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have made it possible to model the behaviour of agents adopting a variety of complex 
strategies, allowing their behaviour to evolve over time in response to past performance.  
Lettau (1997) sets up an artificial financial market with a set of heterogeneous learning 
agents.  The model is used to decide how to distribute wealth between a risky and a 
risk-free asset.  A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is applied for obtaining the optimal 
parameters in various specifications for the portfolio policy.  Generally speaking, these 
artificial markets with heterogeneous behaviour appear to b e  c l o s e r  t o  r e a l  w o r l d  
markets.  Shimokawa et al. (2007) build an agent-based equilibrium model which is 
consistent with the well-known stylized facts characterising financial markets; it appears 
that many of them can be explained by modelling traders as being loss-averse.  
A branch of the literature on financial crises focuses on forecasting the outset of 
crises by developing early warning systems (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky, 1999; 
Reagle and Salvatore, 2000).  We build a multinational mixed-game agent-based model, 
as a first step in developing an early warning system for financial contagion.  Existing 
studies have shown that irrational choices by noise traders lead to the emergence of 
herding behaviour and other risk factors (De Long et al., 1990; Cont and Bouchaud, 
2000; Alfarano, 2006).  Therefore we include noise traders and herding behaviour in our 
simulation setup in order to analyse contagion.  
We take a mixed-game approach, which is based on the minority game model 
introduced by Challet and Zhang (1997) and then extended by Gou (2006).  This is an 
effective framework for studying more realistic and complex markets.  Evolutionary 
Programming (EP) is also adopted to obtain optimal estimates of the model parameters 
– this has already been used very successfully in many combinatorial optimisation 
problems (Yao et al., 1999).  Our multinational model is estimated using time series  
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data from the stock markets of Thailand, South Korea and Hong Kong up to the Asian 
crisis of 1997.  The aim is to detect contagion at an early stage by analysing the 
simulation parameters and their characteristics, and therefore enable policy-makers to 
recognise financial crises with the potential to destabilise cross-market linkages.  In the 
real world, such information would be extremely valuable for taking appropriate risk 
management decision.  Thus our analysis will contribute to developing a framework for 
the management of financial crises.  
 
2.  MIXED-GAME MULTINATIONAL MODEL 
2.1.  Minority Game 
The Minority Game (MG) was developed by Challet and Zhang (1997), and later 
on used to model the market behaviour of heterogeneous agents (Kalinowski et al., 2000; 
Challet et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2001; Jefferies et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2008).  
While the formulation of the original MG model allows no communication, Kalinowski 
et al. (2000) develop a model where agents communicate with each other, and some of 
them are able to cooperate due to self-organization.  Challet et al. (2001) analyse the 
stylized facts of financial markets using an MG based approach.  Jefferies et al. (2001) 
and Johnson et al. (2001) build on minority games and develop Grand Canonical games, 
using that approach in a multi-agent game model to predict future movements in 
financial time-series.  Improved forecasting accuracy is achieved when adding majority 
game agents, who play together with the minority game ones in a mixed-game model 
(Chen et al., 2008).   
 
4
The basic MG structure involves an odd number N of market players, each of 
whom has to choose an action (buy or sell) every time period.  The two possible actions 
are denoted as {} 1 , 1− + .  The players who have made the minority choice win the game 
in the corresponding period.  Market participants work with limited memory, and can 
only rely on information about the winning side choice in the last M periods.  An agent 
makes the next-step decision, based on his own strategy table (private information), and 
on the M-size record (public information) available to all market participants.  The M-
size string at time t is denoted by  t μ ,  ) ,..., ( 1 t 1 m t t − − − = χ χ μ , where  t χ  stands for the 
winning sign in period t.  There are 
M 2 possible winning-choice histories that can be 
assigned to the string  t μ , as shown in the first column of Table 1.  That results in 
M 2 2  
possible strategies for each player.  Each agent works with K strategies in his decision 
table, where 
M 2 2 K << , and is not aware of the decision tables of other players.  In a 
decision table, a strategy recommends a fixed action for each possible history string  t μ .  
At time t, an agent i selects one of the strategies available to him, and takes the action 
recommended by that strategy.  The selection is based on the string  t μ , and the action 
taken is denoted by 
t
i ,
μ α± .  
Table 1:  Example  decision table of agent i, for M=3, K=2. 
μt   S1,i  S2,i 
 -1,  -1,  -1   -1  +1 
 -1,  -1, +1  +1   -1 
 -1, +1,  -1   -1  +1 
 -1, +1, +1  +1  +1 
+1,  -1,  -1   -1   -1 
+1,  -1, +1   -1  +1 
+1, +1,  -1   -1  +1 
+1, +1, +1   +1   -1 
 
We randomly draw K strategies for each player, and as the strategy pool is quite 
large, this assures that players have heterogeneous decision tables.  Strategy j for player  
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i is denoted with  ) N ... 1 i , K ... 1 j ( S i , j = = .  Table 1 shows a decision table when the 
number of available strategies to an agent is K=2, and the size of the memory or history 
string  t μ  is M=3.  Furthermore, each strategy collects a virtual point if its predicted 
action is on the winning side.  A player makes the decision of  1 +  or  1 − , following the 
strategy with the highest virtual score in his decision table.  
Finally, we summarize the actions of the population of agents at time t, and get 
the excess demand  ) ... ( A N 2 1 t
μ μ μ α α α + + + = .  The minority side wins the game, 
therefore the sign chosen by the minority of market participants at time t  is 
) A sgn( t t − = χ .  The new history string is then constructed as  ) ,..., ( t 1 M t 1 t χ χ μ + − + = .  
2.2.  Model Structure 
Gou (2006) extends the MG by adding majority game players and formulating a 
mixed-game model.  The odd number of agents N is divided into two groups, where N1 
is the number of majority game players and N2 is the number of minority game players.  
Similarly,  M1 and K1 denote the memory size and the size of strategy tables for 
majority game players, while M2 and K2 denote the same properties for minority 
players.  The approach adopted by the majority players only differs in the condition of 
win: an agent wins if his action is on the majority side.  Thus the two types of players 
will record opposite winning signs for the same market move.  Fox example, a price 
increase implies that the majority of players have selected to buy, and the minority to 
sell.  The winning action for a majority player is buying, and for a minority player is 
selling.  Therefore, the sign  t χ  chosen by majority players for the record string  t μ  at 
time t is  ) A sgn( t t = χ .  The agents also collect virtual points for their strategies over  
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time windows denoted with T1 for majority players and T2 for minority players.  The 









μ δ , (1) 
where the parameter δ is a scale factor. 
For the purpose of simulating the linkage between two markets, we extend the 
mixed-game model and allow players to make investment decision based on 
information from both the domestic and the foreign market.  The players still invest in 
the domestic market, and not in the foreign market.  Let us assume that for player i, 
A N ,..., 1 i = , the domestic market is A, and B is the foreign market.  Therefore, player i 
faces two possible actions, based on the two strings  A μ  and  B μ , from markets A and B, 
respectively.  The probability 
A
t i, π  of player i choosing an action at time t based on the 
domestic market A is given by equation (2), and the probability 
B
t i, π   of that agent 
choosing an action based on the foreign market B by (3) (Serguieva and Wu, 2007; 
Caporale et al., 2008): 
( )


















t , i 1 π π − = , (3) 
Here, 
A λ  is a scale factor, and the parameter  t , i ω   corresponds to the virtual points.   
These depend on whether the player is winning or not in the domestic and foreign 
markets.  If at time t the action based on the domestic market is the same as that based 
on the foreign market, then the parameter  t , i ω  does not change.  If the action based on  
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market A wins the game and that based on market B loses then  t , i ω  increases, otherwise 
t , i ω  decreases.  All actions are taken  in the domestic market.  
Next, we consider simulating herding behaviour, as it has been identified as a 
major factor behind contagion.  Herding behaviour arises due to irrational investment 
choices made by noise traders (Bouchaud and Cont, 1998; De Long et al., 1990).  Such 
behaviour has been described and simulated using agent-based models (Alfarano et al., 
2006; Serguieva and Wu, 2007).  Kaizoji (2001) investigates the impact of herding 
behaviour on financial crises between correlated markets.  We introduce here a 
proportion of noise traders into the multinational mixed-game model.  They have a 
tendency to follow the sign of the final change in all markets.  For example, in market 
A, the probability 
A
buy , t , n π  of noise traders to take a buy action is defined by equation (4) 
(Caporale et al., 2008): 















































− − . (5) 
Here, 
A
t P  or 
B
t P  is the price in market A or B, respectively.  The parameters 
A , A τ  and 
B , A τ  measure the sensitivity of noise traders in market A towards the market movement 
in  A and B, respectively.  If we extend the multinational model to more than two 
markets, then the definition of parameter 
A






















τ ζ , (6)  
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where  {} marketZ ,..., marketC , marketB , marketA z∈ .  Finally, the probability 
A
sell , t , n π  of 
noise traders in market A to choose a sell action is 
A
B , t , n
A
S , t , n 1 π π − = .  
 






























Figure 1.  The effect of the sensitivity factor and the scaling factor 
Left: the probability of smart traders taking action based on the domestic market, 
πDomestic calculated with equ. (2) for different values of the scale factor λ.  
        line λ=1; square λ=0.2; diamond λ=0.1; cross λ=0.05; triangle λ=0.01 
Right: the probability of noise traders selecting to buy, 
πn,B calculated with equ. (4) for different values of the sensitivity factor τ.  
        line τ=0; square τ=5; diamond τ=10; cross τ=30; triangle τ=70. 
 
The features of definitions (2) and (4) are summarized as follows.  At the very 
beginning,  0 0 , i = ω   in formula (2), and agents have the same probability to take an 
action based on the domestic or foreign market.  If the action based on the domestic 
market wins the game and that based on foreign market loses, then the parameter is 
updated from 0 to  0 1 , i > ω .  This will increase the probability 
A
1 , i π  of taking in the next 
period the action based on the domestic market.  If such situation happens continually, 
that probability will get close to 1.  If the opposite situation occurs, the probability will 
decrease until near 0, but meanwhile the probability of taking the action based on the 
foreign market will increase up to near 1.  Considering definition (4), at the beginning 
or in equilibrium, the relative sum of market changes  0
A
0 = ζ  and noise traders choose 





t > ζ , then the probability of noise traders deciding to buy is larger than that 
of choosing to sell, and vice versa.  As Figure 1 shows, the factors λ and τ can be 
employed to adjust the speed of the probability getting close to 1 or 0.  Therefore, λ and 
τ can be used to describe characteristics of different markets.  
 
2.3.  Evolving Model Parameters 
Modelling real market movement requires optimal parameter configurations.   
With appropriate configurations, artificial markets can reproduce stylized features and 
phenomena of financial time series, such as fat tails (Bouchaud and Cont, 1998; 
Guillaume et al., 1997) or financial contagion (Caporale et al., 2008).  Various 
parameter configurations can also be used to describe the characteristics of different 
markets.  Evolutionary Programming (EP) is one of a class of paradigms for simulating 
evolution by iteratively generating increasingly appropriate solutions.  It was introduced 
by L. Fogel (1962), and has been successfully applied to many numerical and 
combinatorial optimization problems (D. Fogel, 1991; D. Fogel, 1993).  The EP 
procedure involves two major steps (Yao, 1999): 
a)   populations are generated as parents generate respective offspring via mutation;  
b)   better individuals from the parents and offspring populations are selected as 
parents for the next generation. 
Following this procedure, we first initialize the population.  Table 2 lists the parameters 
in the multinational agent-based model.  Each individual in the initial population 
corresponds to a parameter configuration, where the values of the parameters are 
randomly initialised.    
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Table 2:  Parameters of the artificial stock market 
Parameters Description  Constraints 
N1  number of majority game players  N/2<N1<N, integer 
N2  number of minority game players  1<N2<N/2, integer 
N_noise  number of noise traders  0<=Nnoise<N/2, integer 
M1  memory size of majority game player  2<M1<M2, integer  
M2  memory size of minority game players  M2<10, integer 
K1  strategy table size of majority game players  2<K1<K2, integer 
K2  strategy table size of minority game players  K2<10, integer 
T1  time widow of majority game players  30<T1<T2, integer 
T2  time window of minority game players  T2<100, integer 
δ  scale factor for pricing  0<δ<10 
τ  sensitivity factor  0<=τ 
Note:  It is currently assumed that λ=1; in the future that parameter will also be included in the optimisation procedure. 
 
The initial population is regarded as the parents of the first generation.  For each 
parent, a single offspring is generated through mutation.  Then, the fitness of all 
individuals is evaluated, and a tournament selection is applied to both parents and 
offspring, to generate the next parent population.  The repetition of mutation and 
selection steps stops if the halting criterion is satisfied (see the pseudo-code below): 
1.  t = 0;  
2.  Initialize: Parents
t (N1, N2, Nnoise, M1, M2, K1, K2, T1, T2, δ, τ); 











If (halting criterion is satisfied) 
Stop;  
otherwise:  
  t = t+1; 
} 
In order to evaluate the fitness of individuals, we measure the performance of parameter 
configurations.  The time series generated with the artificial stock market under 
particular parameter configuration are compared with the real time series of the target 
market.  We use one individual parameter configuration for a number of simulations of 
the artificial market, and consider the mean fitness of those simulations as the final  
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fitness value of the corresponding parameter configuration.  Thus the fitness function of 
an individual in the population is formulated in (7):  










where θ stands for the number of repetitive simulation, and the ith simulation’s price 
time series is denoted by  () t P
i
sim ,  θ ,..., 1 i = .  Also, the real time series in the target 
market is denoted by  () t P real , and T stands for the size of the series used to estimate the 
model.  
 
3.  SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
Our aim is to simulate the occurrence of financial contagion during a financial 
crisis.  We focus on the behaviour of simulated price series under various parameter 
configurations.  Under some configurations, the simulated series for the target market 
show little interdependence with the crisis-origin market, under any conditions.  For 
other parameters, the simulated price series for the affected market exhibit strong 
linkages with the behaviour of the crisis origin, whether during a stable or a crisis 
period.  Those behaviours do not simulate the most important feature of financial 
contagions, i.e. the significant increase in cross-market linkages. 
The EP procedure outlined above is applied to the mixed-game multinational 
model in order to optimize parameter configurations for target real markets, and then 
those parameters are used to simulate the occurrence of contagion during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997.  The crisis originated in Thailand, and affected the markets in 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asian countries.  Figures 2 
and 3 show the behaviour of the markets in South Korea and Hong Kong in respect to  
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Thailand, over a horizon of 222 trading days, from 25/02/1997 till 31/12/1997.  The first 
111 days correspond to the pre-crisis phase, and the following 111 days represent the 
crisis phase.  During the first phase, Thailand suffers an initial tumble and then 
rebounds, while South Korea and Hong Kong do not follow that tumble and their 
markets are unaffected.  During the second phase, Thailand suffers another plunge and 
this is quickly reflected in the behaviour of South Korea and Hong Kong, and other 
Asian markets.  We will simulate the markets in South Korea (SK) and Hong Kong 



















Stability Phase Crisis Phase
 
 
Figure 2.  Indices of Thailand’s and South Korea’s stock market, 25/02/1997 - 31/12/1997.  
The solid blue line corresponds to the country where the crisis originated, Thailand, 
and the dash red line represents an affected market, South Korea. The left side 
































































Stability Phase Crisis Phase
 
 
Figure 3.  Indices of Thailand’s and Hong Kong stock market, 25/02/1997 - 31/12/1997.  
The solid blue line corresponds to the country where the crisis originated, Thailand, 
and the dash red line represents an affected market, Hong Kong. The left side 





Simulated markets are very sensitive to some of the parameters, e.g. Nnoise, δ and 
τ.  For the purpose of investigating their effects, we design some experiments under 
typical values for the rest of the parameters.  The simulated price series of the affected 
market are shown in relation to the TH real market, and the real series of SK serves as 
the reference frame.  Figure 4 depicts 10 simulations under an extreme configuration 
where there exists only one noise trader Nnoise=1, while Figures 5 and 6 present another 
extreme configuration with a large number of noise traders Nnoise=99 (the maximum for 
N=201).  The simulations in Figure 4 do not reveal any linkages with the crisis-origin 
market.  The results there correspond to a very small number of noise traders, and we 
can conclude that the sensitivity factor τ would not affect the simulations.  The results in 
Figure 5 correspond to a very large number of noise traders; however, the parameter  
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configuration includes an extremely small sensitivity factor τ=0.  These simulations still 






















Figure 4.  Affected market simulation under a minimum number of noise traders Nnoise=1.  
The adopted typical values for the rest of the parameters are:  























Figure 5.  Affected market simulation under a large number of noise traders  
and a minimum sensitivity factor, Nnoise=99 (maximum for N=201) and τ=0.  
The adopted typical values for the rest of the parameters are:  
N1=1, N2=101, N=201, M1=3, M2=6, K1=3, K2=6, T1=20, T2=60, δ=5.  
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Comparing the two figures, the fluctuation range of the simulated price in Figure 
5 is narrower than that in Figure 4.  This is because the parameter configuration in 
Figure 5 corresponds to markets without sensitivity τ=0.  Therefore, noise traders have 
equal probability to choose to buy or sell, and the maximum number of noise traders in 
the parameter configuration drives the simulated price series closer to random walks.  In 
the next experiment, we increase the sensitivity factor up to τ=8, while the other 
parameters stay fixed as in the configuration in Figure 5.  Now the simulations in Figure 
6 present a clear tendency to follow the crisis-origin market.  A large number of noise 
traders combined with a high sensitivity factor result in the high interdependence 























Figure 6.  Affected market simulation under a large number of noise traders  
and a high sensitivity factor τ=8.  
The adopted typical values for the rest of the parameters are:  




In the above three experiments, we have observed how the effect of the 
parameter Nnoise is related to the effect of the sensitivity factor τ.  Now consider the  
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scaling factor δ.  Due to the different market indices and trading volumes in each market, 
δ needs to be adjusted to assure that the simulated fluctuations are within the range of 
the specific targeted real market.  For example, the experiments in Figure 7 are 
performed for different values of δ, under a typical parameter configuration of N1=80, 
N2=101, Nnoise=20 and τ=10.  The results show that the fluctuation range of the 























Figure 7.  Affected market simulation under different values of the scale factor δ.  
Five simulations are performed with δ=0.3 and another five simulations with δ=3.  
The adopted typical values for the rest of the parameters are:  





According to the definition of financial contagion given in Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) and Caporale et al. (2005), this occurs when the correlation between the original 
market and the affected market increases significantly from a period of relative stability 
to a period of crisis; otherwise the phenomenon is defined as interdependence.  Let us  
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consider the correlation coefficient between the country from which the crisis originated, 
i.e. Thailand, and one of the affected markets, South Korea.  The correlation coefficient 
in the pre-crisis phase is -0.64, while in crisis it is 0.92 (see Table 3).  In the case of the 
other affected market, Hong Kong, the correlation coefficient pre-crisis is -0.85, and 
during crisis 0.86 (see Table 3).   
 
Table 3.  Estimated parameter configurations  












































Coefficient  Crisis 0.94  0.91 0.92 











































To be able to simulate contagion, we estimate optimal parameter configurations 
for the artificial stock market, applying the EP procedure.  In the procedure, the number 
of generations is sets to 200, the population size is 20, the number of competitors for to 
tournament selection is to 10, and the number of repetitions for each individual  
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parameter configuration is 10.  The optimal parameter configurations are presented in 
Table 3.  In the case of SK and TH, the optimal parameter configuration is N1=7, 
N2=174, N3=20, M1=3, M2=8, K1=4, K2=7, T1=80, T2=131, δ=2.36 and τ=18.1459.  
Simulations with this configuration are shown in Figure 8.  In the case of HK and TH, 
the optimal configuration is N1= 4,  N2=190,  N3=7,  M1=5,  M2=8,  K1=4,  K2=7, 
T1=18,  T2=106,  δ=0.04368 and  τ=12.264.  Simulations with these parameters are 
plotted in Figure 9.  Both Figures reveal that the simulations track reasonably well the 
contagion-affected markets, and that the optimal parameter configurations allow the 






















Stability Phase Crisis Phase
 
 
Figure 8.      Simulations with the optimal parameter configuration for South Korea as  
         the affected market and Thailand as the contagion-origin market. 
triangle line: real index movement in the contagion-origin market of Thailand, 
circle line: real index movement in the contagion-affected market of South Korea,  
solid line: simulated index for the contagion-affected market of SK based on the 
































































Stability Phase Crisis Phase
                 Real Hong Kong
                 Simulations Hong Kong
 
 
Figure 9.      Simulations with the optimal parameter configuration for Hong Kong as  
         the affected market and Thailand as the contagion-origin market. 
triangle line: real index movement in the contagion-origin market of Thailand, 
circle line: real index movement in the contagion-affected market of HongKong,   
solid line: simulated index for the contagion-affected market of HK based on the 





In our previous work (Caporale et al., 2008), we identify appropriate parameter 
configuration, adopting a procedure outlined in Gou (2006).  That approach is referred 
to here as random estimation.  Table 3 summarizes the simulation results under 
parameter configurations identified through random estimation and EP estimation.   
With the EP estimation, the average correlation coefficient between the contagion-
origin TH market and the simulated affected SK market is 0.28 in the pre-crisis phase 
rising to 0.91 in crisis.  Comparing these with the corresponding correlation values of 
0.63 and 0.94 under random estimation, we conclude that the EP procedure 
approximates better the real correlation values of -0.64 and 0.92, respectively.  A 
similar conclusion can be drawn when considering the simulated affected HK market.  
Under EP estimation, the correlation coefficient with the contagion-origin TH market is  
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-0.11 pre-crisis rising to 0.84 during the crisis, while the corresponding values under 
random estimation are 0.48 and 0.96.  The EP procedure better approximates the real 
correlation coefficients of -0.52 pre-crisis and 0.86 during crises.  Notice that the 
correlation coefficient is not explicitly targeted when evaluating the fitness of individual 
configurations in the EP procedure.  In conclusion, the empirical cases provide evidence 
that the EP estimation performs significantly better and is more suitable for simulating 
contagion.   
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we propose a multinational agent-based model to simulate 
contagion occurring during financial crises.  The aim is to capture characteristics of 
linked financial markets contributing to the occurrence of contagion.  These are 
captured by identifying configurations of the agent-based model capable of simulating 
contagion.  We use real data for Thailand, where the Asian crisis of 1997 originated, 
and simulate the movements of the affected markets of South Korea and Hong Kong.  
The simulation results are particularly sensitive to some of the parameters in the 
multinational agent-based model, and their effect is further investigated.  Then an 
evolutionary programming algorithm is adopted for estimating the optimal parameter 
configuration.  The experimental results indicate that EP estimation outperforms earlier 
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